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1. STATUTES 
a. § 31A-22-201 (2002). Required provisions of liability insurance policies 
Every liability insurance policy shall provide that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the 
insured may not diminish any liability of the insurer to third parties, and that if execution 
against the insured is returned unsatisfied, an action may be maintained against the 
insurer to the extent that the liability is covered by the policy. 
b. § 31A-23-308 (2002). Liability of title insurers for acts of title insurance agents 
Any title company, represented by one or more title insurance agents, is directly and 
primarily liable to others dealing with the title insurance agents for the receipt and 
disbursement of funds deposited in escrows with the title insurance agents in all those 
transactions where a commitment or binder for or policy or contract of title insurance of 
that title insurance company has been ordered, or a preliminary report of the title 
insurance company has been issued or distributed. This liability does not modify, 
mitigate, impair, or affect the contractual obligations between the title insurance agents 
and the title insurance company. 
c. § 78-2a-3 (2005). Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other 
local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction 
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the 
court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination 
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
d. § 78-12-1 (2002). Time for commencement of actions generally 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter, 
after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation 
is prescribed by statute. 
e. § 78-12-26 (2002). Within three years 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; except that when waste or 
trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause 
of action does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting such waste or trespass; 
(2) for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including actions for specific 
recovery thereof; except that in all cases where the subject of the action is a domestic 
animal usually included in the term "livestock," which at the time of its loss has a 
recorded mark or brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without 
the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of such 
facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by 
the defendant; 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in such 
case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting 
the fraud or mistake; 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or 
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a different limitation 
is prescribed by the statutes of this state; 
(5) to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except that the cause of action does 
not accrue until the aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm 
suffered. 
2. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
a. Rule 8. General rules of pleadings, 
(a) Claims for relief A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of 
several different types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to 
each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party 
relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 
of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly 
meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny 
only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to 
controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as 
specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the 
averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, 
when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial 
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of 
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, 
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated 
a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice 
so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in 
the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is 
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms 
of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two 
or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently 
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or 
more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or 
defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable 
grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in 
Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial 
justice. 
b. Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a) (1) Capacity. - It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or 
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal 
existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party. A party may raise 
an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be 
sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, by specific 
negative averment, which shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as 
an issue, the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish 
the same on the trial. 
(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an 
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party 
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the 
true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be 
amended accordingly. 
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet 
title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the pleadings 
may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse 
to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto/' 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, 
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions 
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been 
performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made 
specifically and with particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance 
or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing such performance or 
occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to 
aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial 
or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or 
decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of 
jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party 
pleading the judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted 
jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of 
time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material 
matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically 
stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state 
the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is 
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute 
specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise 
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation 
is controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts 
showing that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance 
of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is 
sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by 
its section number or other designation in any official publication of the statutes or 
ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set 
forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter 
out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was 
published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party 
alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or 
spoken. 
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may 
allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating 
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification 
or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances. 
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the 
judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint. 
(1) Allocation of fault. 
(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78, Chapter 27 shall file: 
(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; and. 
(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party, 
including name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party 
is unknown, the party shall so state. 
(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the party's 
responsive pleading if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed 
within a reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal basis on which 
fault can be allocated but no later than the deadline specified in the discovery plan under 
Rule 26(f). The court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file 
the information specified in subsection (1)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted 
by this rule, but in no event later than 90 days before trial. 
(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule. 
c. Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a 
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and 
complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons 
and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a 
cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The 
plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after 
service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after 
service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the 
court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect 
the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, 
the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading 
shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at 
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of 
such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such 
time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and 
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and 
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity 
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in subdivision (b) 
of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment 
mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on 
application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings and determination 
thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a 
responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing 
a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the 
details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten 
days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court 
may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems 
just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if 
no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 
twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any 
pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with 
it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion 
under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available 
which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a 
motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in 
subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either 
by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, 
and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on 
the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 
action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial 
of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out 
of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the 
plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such 
plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity 
therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $ 300.00 undertaking with sufficient 
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against 
such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of 
the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as 
ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the 
defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
d. Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may 
so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend 
his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an 
amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if 
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable 
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading 
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of 
the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the 
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court 
deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, specifying the time therefor. 
e. Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order 
from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report 
of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they are 
entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise 
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than 
one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or 
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1J Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every 
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given 
for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or 
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute 
of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other 
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with 
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to 
the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of 
judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a 
memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file 
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily 
incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, 
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill 
of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent 
to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the 
entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date 
judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that 
purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment 
docket. 
f. Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
3. FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 
CERTIFYING RULINGS ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
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The above-referenced matter came before the Court pursuant to Motions for 
Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) filed by Defendants Fireman's Fund 
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Fireman's") and Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation 
(hereinafter "Lawyers") and on Big Sky Company's (hereinafter "Big Sky") Motion to 
Extend Time to Appeal and/or Clarification as to Entry of Judgment Having 
considered the memoranda filed by the parties, the Court entered a written Ruling on 
January 14,2005 wherein the Court granted Fireman's and Lawyers' Motions for Rule 
54(b) Certification and Big Sky's Motion for Clarification of the Judgment. The Court 
also found that the Rulings were final judgments with respect to Fireman's and 
Lawyers, however the Court held that because the parties tailed to request that the 
Court make a Rule 54(b) determination ar the time that the judgments were signed and 
entered, that it would be unfair to Big Sky to relate the Court's Decision back to the date 
when the original orders were signed. The Court also decided that the right to appeal 
Fireman's and Lawyers' judgments should start from the date that the Court makes the 
Rule 54(b) determination. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO FIREMAN'S FUND'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. On August 9/ 2004, the Court granted Fireman's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and on September 10,2004 the Court entered an Order on the matter, 
2. In its September 10,2004 Order, the Court held that Big Sky was unable to 
show that Fireman's owed Big Sky a duty to disclose as Big Sky shared no contractual, 
2 
fiduciary or confidential relationship with Fireman's. The Court also determinied that 
Big Sky's claim for fraudulent nondisclosure lacked factual merit and that Big Sky 
faded to bring its fraudulent non-disclosure claim within the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
3* The Court amends its Order dated September 10,2004 to reflect the fact that 
the claims against Defendants Avis and Archibald share no common facts or legal 
issues with the fraudulent non-disclosure claim asserted by Big Sky. 
4. The Court concludes that based on the separate and distinct nature of the 
claims against Fireman's and Defendant Avis and Archibald, there is no just reason for 
delay in certifying its Order on Fireman's Motion for Summary Judgment as final and 
appealable pursuant to Rule 54{b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Given that the 
remaining claims against Avis and Archibald share not common facts or legal issues 
with the claim against Fireman's, the Court Orders that its September 10,2004 Order be 
certified as a final and appealable under Rule 54(b). 
5. Plaintiffs time for filing an appeal of this Order is extended ior thirty (30) 
days from the date of this signed Order. 
RULE 54(B) FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO 
LAWYERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6. On July 8,2004, the Court entered an order granting Lawyers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
7. The Court held that Big Sky's Amended Complaint asserted a single cause of 
3 
2 action against Lawyers' for fraudulent non-disclosure and that the Amended Complaint 
H
 did not assert any cause of action under Utah Code Ann. §31 A-23a-407 (2004), nor did 
I 
^ the Amended Complaint mention or assert specifically against Lawyers any agency 
n
 theory. The Court also held that Lawyers' made no attempt to secret away or 
fraudulently conceal information concerning the existence of Avis and Archibald's E&O 
Policy. 
8. The Court amends its Order dated July 8,2004 to reflect the fact that the 
claims against Defendants Avis and Archibald share no common facts or legal issues 
with the fraudulent non-disclosure claim asserted by Big Sky. 
9. The Court concludes that based on the separate and distinct nature of the 
claims against Lawyers and Defendant Avis and Archibald, there is no just reason for 
delay in certifying its Order on Laywers' Motion for Summary Judgment as final and 
appealable pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Given that the 
remaining claims against Avis and Archibald share not common facts or legal issues 
with the claim against Lawyers, the Court Orders that its July 8,2004 Order be certified 
as a final and appealable under Rule 54(b). 
10. Plaintiffs time for filing an appeal of this Order is extended for thirty (30) 
days from the date of this signed Order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Court's 
September 10,2004 Order on Fireman's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court's 
4 
1f 
S 
July 8,2004 Order on Lawyers' Motion for Summary Judgment are certified as final and 
appealable under Rule 54(b) and that Big Sky's time for filing any appeal from those 
judgments is extended for thirty (30) days from the date of this Order is signed. 
DATED this 2W- day ofJebwwry 2005, 
BY THE COURT 
to- fcS-H^ 
Judge W, Brent West 
Second District Court Judge 
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OGDEN, UTAH APRIL 21, 2004 
THE COURT: YOU MAY BE SEATED. THANK YOU. ALL RIGHT. 
WE GOT EVERYBODY? ALL RIGHT. THIS IS THE TIME SET FOR A 
SERIES OF MOTIONS IN THE MATTER OF BIG SKY VERSUS AVIS AND 
ARCHIBALD TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. WHICH ORDER DO YOU 
WANNA TAKE THESE MOTIONS IN, COUNSEL? 
MR. VASQUEZ: YOUR HONOR, EDWARD VASQUEZ AND RICK 
RAPPAPORT FOR LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE. WE'D LIKE TO HAVE OUR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARD FIRST. 
THE COURT: SOMEBODY SUBMITTED A MOTION SAYING THEY 
WANTED ME TO HEAR THE MOTION TO AMEND FIRST. WASN'T THAT YOU 
GUYS? 
MR., VASQUEZ: WE FILED A NOTICE TO SUBMIT ON THE MOTION 
TO AMEND. 
THE COURT: I MEAN I'M NOT ARGUING WITH YOU, BUT I WAS 
REMEMBERING THAT LAST NIGHT AND THAT'S THE ORDER I WROTE 'EM 
DOWN. 
MR. DURBANO: YOUR HONOR, THERE MAY BE SOME LOGICAL 
SENSE IN DEALING WITH THEM THAT ORDER. IT MIGHT MOVE THINGS 
ALONG QUICKLY. 
THE COURT: YEAH, IN THE INTEREST OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY, 
LAWYERS TITLE AND BIG SKY RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT THIS 
COURT HEAR THE ARGUMENT IN THE AFOREMENTIONED MOTION IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH THE PARTIES' OTHER MOTIONS, AND YOU WANTED 
ME TO HEAR THE MOTION TO CONTINUE FIRST AND THEN THE MOTION 
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TO AMEND. BUT I DON'T CARE, WHATEVER ORDER YOU WANNA DO IT 
IN. IT MAKES SENSE TO ME THAT WE HEAR THE MOTION TO CONTINUE 
FIRST AND THE MOTION TO AMEND FIRST BEFORE WE DO THE MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. IF I CONTINUE IT, IT'S MOOT. IF I 
ALLOW 'EM TO AMEND, IT MAY OR MAY NOT BE MOOT. SO I REALLY 
THINK WE NEED TO HEAR THOSE FIRST. SO LET'S START OVER HERE. 
YOU'RE THE ONE THAT ASKED FOR A CONTINUANCE. DO YOU STILL 
WANT IT? 
MR. DURBANO: THAT*D JUST BE UNDER 56(F), YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. DURBANO: I'D LIKE TO JUST ADDRESS 'EM BOTH REAL 
QUICK — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. DURBANO: — AND THEN WHICHEVER THE COURT DECIDES IS 
APPROPRIATE HERE. I THINK THAT CLEARLY WE NEED ADDITIONAL 
TIME TO CONTINUE, IF YOU WILL, FLUSHING THIS OUT. NOW, THE 
COURT MAY NOTE THAT THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE FILED A 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. DURBANO: WHETHER THAT IS APPROPRIATE TO BE HEARD AT 
THIS TIME OR NOT, LEAVE THAT TO THE COURT'S DISCRETION. 
WE'RE PREPARED TO ADDRESS IT. BUT LET'S START SIMPLY WITH 
THE MOTION TO AMEND. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. DURBANO: SIMPLE. IN MY MIND, YOUR HONOR, IT'S AN 
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EASY ONE. THE FACTS HAVE REMAINED CONSISTENT SINCE 1997. 
THE ONLY THING THAT HAS CHANGED THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THIS 
LITIGATION IS THAT THERE HAS BEEN I'LL CALL IT THIRD PARTY 
ACTIONS ONGOING AND THEN ACTIONS BY THIRD PARTIES, IF I CAN 
USE THAT QUAINT SAYING, THAT HAVE CONTINUALLY SHAPED THIS 
LITIGATION. WE START WITH A STRAIGHTFORWARD CAUSE OF ACTION. 
A TITLE AGENCY, AVIS AND ARCHIBALD, TAKES IN ESCROW FUNDS. 
WAYNE OGDEN, WHO'S NOW INFAMOUS — NOT QUITE SURE WHAT 
HAPPENED TO HIM THIS LAST GO-ROUND, BUT ANYWAY, THE INFAMOUS 
WAYNE OGDEN — 
THE COURT: HE'S — HE'S BACK IN PRISON. 
MR. DURBANO: IS HE BACK? DID THEY FIND HIM? I DIDN'T 
KNOW, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: HE'S BACK IN PRISON. 
MR. DURBANO: THAT'S WHERE HE BELONGS. THE INFAMOUS 
WAYNE OGDEN GETS IN CAHOOTS WITH AVIS AND ARCHIBALD. GETS 
THEM TO MISHANDLE ESCROW FUNDS. AS TO BIG SKY, THEY 
ULTIMATELY HAVE ALREADY, TWO OR THREE YEARS AGO, OBTAINED A 
JUDGMENT AGAINST AVIS AND ARCHIBALD FOR THE MISHANDLING OF 
THE FUNDS. THROUGH THE PROCESS, THOUGH, BIG SKY CONTINUES TO 
DEFEND AGAINST THE TRUSTEES' PREFERENTIAL TRANSFER, SO ~ 
THE COURT: THAT'S THE ONE THAT WENT UP TO THE TENTH 
CIRCUIT, RIGHT? 
MR. DURBANO: WENT TO THE TENTH CIRCUIT. THE COURT MAY 
RECALL THAT THE JUDGMENT THAT BIG SKY HAS AGAINST AVIS AND 
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ARCHIBALD IS BLANK AS TO THE AMOUNT. WE WEREN'T SURE. COULD 
BE THAT BIG SKY WOULD COME BACK AND SAY, ALL WE HAVE HERE'S 
DEFENSE COSTS PERHAPS. WE DON'T KNOW. TENTH CIRCUIT RULES 
YEARS SOMEWHAT AGO THAT TRUSTEE PREVAILS. AND THAT'S WHAT 
BRINGS THIS CASE REALLY BACK TO LIFE. 
BIG SKY TAKES A POSITION AFTER THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT 
RULING THAT UNDER THE STATUTE, UTAH STATUTE, I'LL JUST REFER 
TO IT AS A SECTION 308, THOUGH IT'S CHANGED NOW, A TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY IS STRICTLY LIABLE OR PRIMARILY LIABLE FOR 
THE MISDEEDS OF THEIR AGENCY, AVIS AND ARCHIBALD. THIS'D BE 
LAWYERS TITLE UNDER THE STATUTE IS HELD STRICTLY LIABLE, FOR 
THE VERY REASONS THAT NOW LAWYERS TITLE ARGUES THAT THEY 
SHOULD NOT BE LIABLE BECAUSE THEY HAVE A CONTRACT THAT SAYS 
AVIS AND ARCHIBALD, YOU CAN'T BE AN ESCROW AGENT AND HANDLE 
FUNDS. WELL, THAT'S WHERE ALL THE LIABILITY IS. SO THE UTAH 
LEGISLATURE IN THEIR WISDOM SAYS, NO, IF A TILE AGENCY IS 
AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE POLICIES OF TITLE INSURANCE, THEN ANY 
ESCROW DEALINGS CONNECTED WITH THAT POLICY OF TITLE 
INSURANCE, WHETHER THEY'RE GOOD OR BAD, BECOME THE DEALINGS 
OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY. IN OTHER WORDS, THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY MUST TRAIN, SHEPHERD, WATCH OVER, AND ULTIMATELY BE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR INSURANCE AGENCIES. 
WE, BIG SKY, BEGIN TO PRESS LAWYERS TITLE AS WELL AS 
PAUL'S CLIENT, MR. BELNAP'S CLIENT, FIREMAN'S FUND, SAYING 
AVIS AND ARCHIBALD ESSENTIALLY HAS CEASED TO DO BUSINESS. WE 
1 LOOK TO THE INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR PAYMENT HERE. WE'VE LOST 
2 AT TENTH CIRCUIT COURT. SWUNG HARD; WE MISSED. IN RESPONSE, 
3 LAWYERS TITLE FILES A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SAYING THAT 
4 THE PLEADINGS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAIMT WHICH BROUGHT THEM 
5 INTO THE ACTION WERE ONLY AS TO A FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF 
6 CERTAIN INFORMATION, NONDISCLOSURE, FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE. 
7 FAIRLY RECENT TORT THAT WAS CITED IN A SUPREME COURT CASE. 
8 OUR POSITION IS, NO, THE FACTS ARE CONSISTENT. THE 
9 FACTS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN THE SAME RIGHT FROM THE START. JAYSON 
10 CHERRY, AVIS AND ARCHIBALD MISHANDLED ESCROW FUNDS. THERE'S 
11 NOTHING IN THE UTAH PROCEDURAL CODES, THE RULES CIVIL 
12 PROCEDURE, THAT WOULD REQUIRE SUCH SPECIFICITY IN THE AMENDED 
13 COMPLAINT. CLEARLY, LAWYERS TITLE, YOU MUST BE ON NOTICE 
14 STATUTORILY THAT AS AN INSURANCE CARRIER, ISSUING POLICIES OF 
15 TITLE INSURANCE, AUTHORIZING YOUR AGENTS TO DEAL IN ESCROW 
16 FUNDS, THAT YOU ARE IN ESSENCE PRIMARILY OR STRICTLY LIABLE 
17 UNDER THE STATUTE. 
18 NOW, IF YOU DIDN'T KNOW THAT, YOU SHOULD HAVE, BUT 
19 PRESUMABLY YOU DON'T GIVEN YOUR PLEADINGS, THOUGH IT SEEMS 
20 HARD TO BELIEVE. WELL, THEN, LET US AMEND THE COMPLAINT. 
21 THERE'S BEEN NO DISCOVERY, WE'RE NOT PREPARED FOR TRIAL. NO 
22 ONE COULD ARGUE THAT THE DELAY HAS RESULTED IN A INABILITY TO 
23 PREPARE OR TO MEET AND ANSWER THESE ALLEGATIONS. 
24 SO OUR POINT IS SIMPLY AS TO THE MOTION TO AMEND, YOUR 
25 HONOR, IT'S NOT NECESSARY. THIS PARTICULAR DEFENDANT IS, HAS 
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BEEN, SHOULD HAVE BEEN WELL NOTIFIED. AND AS THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT HELD, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO SPECIFICALLY 
ALLEGE A LIABILITY UNDER A STATUTE, IF YOU WILL, THE STATUTE 
THAT ARE OF RECORDS, PUBLIC DOMAIN, THE WORLD'S ON NOTICE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. BUT NOW LET ME ASK YOU A FEW 
QUESTIONS ~ 
MR. DURBANO: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: — MR. DURBANO. FIRST OF ALL, I'VE READ THE 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. THE ONLY CAUSE OF ACTION THAT I CAN 
FIND THERE AGAINST LAWYERS TITLE IS THAT THEY FRAUDULENTLY 
WITHHELD THE FACT THAT THERE WAS AN INSURANCE AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THEM AND I BELIEVE — WHAT'S THE COM — AVIS ~ 
MR. DURBANO: AVIS AND ARCHIBALD. 
THE COURT: — AVIS AND ARCHIBALD. THAT WAS MY 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ONLY THEORY THERE. AND NOW AREN'T YOU 
ALLEGING A SECOND THEORY UNDER THE NEW AMENDMENT? AREN'T YOU 
NOW RELYING ON A STATUTORY THING THAT — I MEAN AREN'T YOU 
REALLY TAKING TWO SEPARATE BITES OF THE APPLE AT THIS 
DEFENDANT? 
MR. DURBANO: LET ME ADDRESS IT, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. DURBANO: THAT IS THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT. I WOULD 
TAKE EXCEPTION TO IT. I THINK THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT — 
AND AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, ALL IT 
SIMPLY ADDS IS IN THE STATEMENT OF FACTS, AFTER IT DESCRIBES 
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WHO LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY IS, PUTS COMMA, WHO IS 
VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF THEIR AGENT. 
NOW, THE THOUGHT THAT CROSSED MY MIND IS, WHY ELSE WOULD 
THEY HAVE BEEN NAMED. THEY ARE AN INSURANCE COMPANY. I MEAN 
AN INSURANCE COMPANY, AN INSURED MEANS THAT THEY'RE BACKING 
SOMEBODY. AND THEY WERE NAMED AS THE INSURANCE COMPANY FOR 
THEIR — FOR AN AGENCY REFERRED TO AS AVIS AND ARCHIBALD 
TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY. IF THAT WASN'T ENOUGH NOTICE ~ 
THOUGH I WOULD ARGUE THAT IT IS — THEN THE SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT DOES ADD A HALF A SENTENCE INDICATING THAT THEY ARE 
IN FACT THE PRINCIPAL FOR THEIR AGENT. 
THE COURT: WELL, IT DOES ~ 
MR. DURBANO: YEAH. 
THE COURT: ~ SEEM TO ME IN MY LAYMAN'S MIND TO BE A 
SEPARATE APPROACH TO MAKING THE INSURANCE COMPANY LIABLE. I 
MEAN, MOST INSURANCE COMPANY SITUATIONS, I'M THE DRIVER OF AN 
AUTOMOBILE, I'M INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT, AND THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY AGREES TO COME IN AN INSURE AND COVER ME. THEY'RE 
BASICALLY STEPPING INTO MY POSITION AND PROTECTING ME BECAUSE 
I PAID FOR THIS INSURANCE. HERE IT'S A SITUATION WHERE 
YOU'RE ARGUING UNDER THE FIRST ONE -- AT FIRST, I THOUGHT 
WHEN YOU RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A 
FRAUDULENT INSURANCE POLICY, THAT THEY HAD SOME SORT OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY INSURANCE POLICY THAT THEY HAD 
THAT GUARANTEED, YOU KNOW, KIND OF LIKE AVIS AND ARCHIBALD 
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INSURING THEIR EMPLOYEES THAT IF IN FACT THEY MISAPPROPRIATED 
FUNDS OR SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE, THAT THERE WOULD BE AN 
INSURANCE POLICY THAT WOULD COVER THE ACTS OF THEIR 
EMPLOYEES. AND INITIALLY WHEN I READ IT, I THOUGHT YOU --
THAT YOU WERE ALLEGING THAT THEY HAD SUCH A POLICY AND NO ONE 
TOLD YOU ABOUT IT, AND THEREFORE, YOU WERE SAYING THAT THEY 
FRAUDULENTLY HID THE EXISTENCE OF THAT POLICY. THEN I READ 
IT A LITTLE BIT MORE CLOSER AND YOU'RE COMING IN NOW ON A 
SECOND THEORY THAT SAYS, HEY, I FOUND SOME UTAH LAW THAT SAYS 
UNDER THE AGENT/PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLES, THAT THEY'RE 
VICARIOUSLY RESPONSIBLE IF THEIR AGENTS WHO THEY AUTHORIZE TO 
ISSUE INSURANCE ON THEIR BEHALF — IN THIS INSTANCE TITLE 
INSURANCE — MISAPPROPRIATE THE MONEYS. THAT TO ME IS A 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IN A DIFFERENT — DIFFERENT TWIST TO 
THE SAME ONE. I DO THINK THE WORD OF THE USE VICARIOUSLY 
LIABLE DOES CHANGE IT SIGNIFICANTLY, BUT YOU'VE ANSWERED MY 
QUESTION. 
AFTER THEY GET THROUGH, I'M GONNA HAVE SOME QUESTIONS 
ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES OR 
IT'S TIME-BARRED. BUT YOU'VE ANSWERED MY QUESTION. THANK 
YOU. 
MR. DURBANO: GOOD ENOUGH. 
THE COURT: YES, SIR. 
MR. DURBANO: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: WHO'S GONNA RESPOND FOR TITLE? 
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MR. RAPAPPORT: I' WILL, YOUR HONOR. I THINK YOUR HONOR 
GETS THE GIST OF IT, AND THAT IS, IS THAT THIS IS A CASE 
THAT'S BEEN GOING ON NOW FOR SEVEN YEARS. WE WEREN'T JOINED 
UNTIL 2002. WE ARE NOT THE PRINCIPAL FOR AVIS AND ARCHIBALD 
WHEN IT COMES TO ESCROW MATTERS. TITLE COMPANY — TITLE — 
LOCAL TITLE COMPANIES WHERE YOU BUY YOUR HOUSE, THEY HAVE TWO 
DISTINCT FUNCTIONS. ONE IS THEY ISSUE POLICIES OF TITLE 
INSURANCE. AND FOR THAT ISSUANCE, THEY ARE OUR AGENT. BUT 
THEY HAVE A TOTALLY SEPARATE BUSINESS WHICH IS THEIR ESCROW 
AND CLOSING BUSINESS. AND THIS CAUSE OF ACTION THAT THEY 
ORIGINALLY PLED AGAINST AVIS AND ARCHIBALD COMES OUT OF THAT 
BUSINESS ABOUT WHICH WE ARE NOT THEIR PRINCIPAL. AND WE 
ATTACHED THE DOCUMENTS, THE CONTRACTS BETWEEN US, WHICH I 
THINK MAKES THAT EXTREMELY, EXTREMELY CLEAR. 
SO WHAT HAPPENS IS, IS THAT THEY ORIGINALLY SUE AVIS AND 
ARCHIBALD IN 1997. AND THEN IN TWO THOU — THE VERY — 
EITHER THE VERY LAST DAY OF 2001 OR SOMETIME IN 2002, WE GET 
BROUGHT IN. WE DON'T GET BROUGHT IN AS PRINCIPAL. WE DON'T 
GET BROUGHT IN ON VICARIOUS LIABILITY. WE DON'T GET BROUGHT 
IN AT ALL HAVING TO DO WITH ANY NEGLIGENCE OR BREACH OF 
FIDUCIARY DUTY. WE, ALONG WITH FIREMAN'S FUND, GET BROUGHT 
IN ON THIS THEORY THAT SOMEHOW WE HAVE DEFRAUDED THEM IN 
TERMS OF NOT TELLING THEM ABOUT A PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
POLICY. 
NOW, THE FACT IS, IS THAT MY COMPANY, LAWYERS TITLE, WE 
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ISSUE TITLE INSURANCE POLICIES. WE DON'T ISSUE LIABILITY 
POLICIES OR MALPRACTICE POLICIES, YOU KNOW, AT LEAST IN THIS 
STATE OR ANYTHING HAVING TO DO WITH THIS — WITH THIS HERE. 
THEY DID — BECAUSE MR. DURBANO HAD ASKED BRYCE PANZER, WHO 
IS KIND OF A PREDECESSOR OF MINE WITH RESPECT TO LAWYERS 
TITLE, HE ASKED HIM WHETHER HE KNEW AS TO WHETHER AVIS AND 
ARCHIBALD HAD A PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICY OR 
LIABILITY POLICY. MR. PANZER SAYS, YES, THEY DO, AND 
IMMEDIATELY SENDS HIM, YOU KNOW, THE NAME OF THE POLICY, WHO 
HE HAD DEALT WITH, I THINK A COPY OF THE POLICY, A CHECK THAT 
WE HAD GOTTEN FROM THE POLICY ON ANOTHER TRANSACTION. YOU 
KNOW, VIRTUALLY, YOU KNOW, IMMEDIATELY. IT WAS, THEREFORE, 
THAT, QUITE FRANKLY, WHEN WE GOT SUED ON THE BASIS OF — AND 
THIS IS THE ONLY ALLEGATION IN THAT ORIGINAL COMPLAINT ~ 
PARDON ME, THE ORIGINAL AMENDED COMPLAINT, I SHOULD SAY — 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. RAPAPPORT: — ON THE BASIS THAT WE HAD DEFRAUDED 
THEM WITH RESPECT TO THAT. I WAS FLABBERGASTED. I HAVE TO 
TELL YOU, I WAS FLABBERGASTED. NUMBER ONE, WE HAD NO DUTY TO 
HELP MR. DURBANO OUT. BUT NUMBER TWO, MR. PANZER GAVE HIM 
EVERY BIT OF INFORMATION THAT HE HAD, YOU KNOW, VIRTUALLY 
IMMEDIATELY. AND TO THEN GET SUED OVER THAT IS KIND OF LIKE 
THE OLD PHRASE, YOU KNOW, NO — OH, I'M GONNA GET IT WRONG 
BUT, YOU KNOW, NO KINDNESS GETS UNPUNISHED OR SOMETHING ~ 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
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MR. RAPAPPORT: ~ TO THAT EFFECT. I THINK I BUTCHERED 
THAT, BUT I APOLOGIZE. SO THAT'S — THAT'"S THE ACTION 
AGAINST US. AND THE REASON THAT I'M GONNA TELL THE COURT 
SOMETHING ELSE IS BECAUSE THERE'VE BEEN A NUMBER OF COMMENTS 
IN MR. DURBANO'S REPLY BRIEF ON THIS MOTION TO AMEND THAT I 
THINK MISSTATE WHAT HAPPENED. SO I CALLED HIM AND I SAID, 
WHY ARE WE HERE. YOU KNOW, LOOK AT — LOOK AT ALL THESE 
DOCUMENTS. YOU KNOW, MR. PANZER WAS TOTALLY FORTHCOMING. 
AND HE SAYS TO ME, WELL, I'M GONNA LOOK AT THE FILE, BUT 
MAYBE I'LL DISMISS YOU. AND THIS WENT ON FOR A SERIES OF 
MONTHS. AND I DIDN'T GET THE DISMISSAL. SO I THEN WROTE HIM 
A LETTER, AND I HAVE A COPY OF IT HERE. I SAID, WHERE IS — 
WHERE IS MY DISMISSAL. AND DOUG WRITES BACK AND SAYS, WELL, 
HE JUST FOUND OUT — THIS IS IN 2003 — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. RAPAPPORT: THIS IS — HERE'S THE OTHER — THIS IS 
THE OTHER LETTER. MR. DURBANO — M R . DURBANO WRITES BACK IN 
JUNE OF 2003, THAT DWAYNE GILLMAN, WHO WAS THE BANKRUPTCY 
TRUSTEE OR THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE'S ATTORNEY, TOLD HIM THAT 
THERE'S A STATUTE THAT MAKES TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY STRICTLY 
LIABLE. AND I ASSUME THERE HE'S TALKING ABOUT SECTION 308. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. ISN'T THAT NOW 31A? 
MR. RAPAPPORT: IT'S — WELL, IT'S — IT WAS 31A-23-308, 
AND NOW IT'S — I THINK 31 ~ 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
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MR. RAPAPPORT: — 23A-407. 
THE COURT: RIGHT, OKAY, YEAH. 
MR. RAPAPPORT: SO ANYTHING IN HERE THAT INDICATES, OH, 
WE'VE ALWAYS BEEN TALKING ABOUT 308, OR RIGHT FROM THE 
BEGINNING I'VE HAD 308 IN MIND, YOU KNOW, JUST I THINK IS — 
IS STRETCHING IT, YOU KNOW, A BIT ~ A BIT MUCH. AND THERE'S 
KIND OF — AT ONE POINT IN THE PLEADING THERE'S AN 
IMPLICATION IN THESE MEMOS THAT WENT BACK AND FORTH, AND I 
UNDERSTAND THAT THEY'RE SOMETIMES DONE IN HASTE AND NOT AS 
CAREFULLY AS ONE WOULD HOPE. BUT THERE'S AN IMPLICATION THAT 
SOMEHOW LAWYERS TITLE WAS SUPPOSED TO — OR WE WERE SUPPOSED 
TO TELL 'EM ABOUT HIS CAUSE OF ACTION OR HIS POTENTIAL CAUSE 
OF ACTION. AND THAT I THINK IS PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S JOB, 
YOU KNOW, IT'S NOT DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL'S JOB TO BE -- TO BE 
TELLING PEOPLE ABOUT THAT. 
SO IN ANY EVENT, YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE ATTACHED TO OUR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. PANZER AS 
WELL AS THE, YOU KNOW, THE LETTERS, THE TITLE POLICY, YOU 
KNOW, THE LETTER OF APRIL 5TH WHERE MR. PANZER WRITES TO 
MR. DURBANO AND GIVES HIM THE NAME OF WHO HE HAD CONTACTED, 
AND THEN HE ~ AND THEN ON APRIL 13TH, MR. DURBANO WRITES 
BACK AND THANKS MISTER — AND THANKS BRYCE FOR SENDING HIM 
THE, YOU KNOW, THE CONTRACT, AND HE WANTS TO KNOW WHETHER WE 
MADE A CLAIM. AND THEN MR. PANZER WRITES BACK AND SAYS, YES, 
WE DID MAKE THE CLAIM, AND SENDS HIM THE POLICY, DOES ALL OF 
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THIS STUFF ~ 
THE COURT: AND THAT — JUST SO I'M CLEAR, THAT'S WHERE 
MR. BELNAP GETS IN BECAUSE THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
POLICY HAS BEEN ISSUED BY FIREMAN'S; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. BELNAP: THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I JUST WANNA MAKE SURE I WAS TRACKING 
THIS AGAIN. OKAY. 
MR. RAPAPPORT: YOU KNOW, SO I DON'T SEE, YOU KNOW, HOW 
WE — HOW THIS CAUSE OF ACTION CAN POSSIBLY BE MAINTAINED 
AGAINST US. SO WE MAKE OUR MOTION AFTER I GET THIS LETTER 
THAT SAYS HE'S NOT GONNA DISMISS ME. I MAKE MY MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHICH I THINK IS AN APPROPRIATE THING TO 
DO. AND THEN HE DEFENDS BY SOMETHING THAT IS NOT PERMITTED, 
WHICH IS BY SAYING, I WANT TO AMEND MY COMPLAINT. HE ALSO 
SAYS THAT SOMEHOW THE COMPLAINT SAYS THAT 308 IS INVOLVED AND 
SAYS THAT AGENCY IS INVOLVED. AND IN FACT, IT DOESN'T SAY 
THAT. THERE'S ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION, AND IT'S FRAUDULENT 
NONDISCLOSURE, FOR WHICH THERE'S NO BASIS, THERE'S NO BASIS 
IN FACT. 
AND AT THIS POINT IN TIME, GOING ON TO THE MOTION TO 
AMEND, SO TO SPEAK, YOU KNOW, I THINK THAT IT'S — YOU HAVE 
TO DO THREE — THERE ARE THREE BASIC ELEMENTS TO, YOU KNOW, 
TO BE ABLE TO HAVE A MOTION TO, YOU KNOW, AMEND AT THIS POINT 
IN TIME. YOU KNOW, YOU HAVE TO SHOW AS TO WHY YOU DIDN'T 
BRING IT EARLIER. YOU KNOW, WHY WAS THIS NOT BROUGHT IN 
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1997. AND THE FACT IS, IS THAT PERHAPS, YOU KNOW, THERE JUST 
WASN'T THE EXTENT OF RESEARCH, YOU KNOW, PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL 
MIGHT HAVE WANTED TO HAVE, YOU KNOW, TO HAVE MADE. 
SO WE THINK THAT THIS MOTION IS VERY UNTIMELY. IF HE 
WANTED US IN ON SOME KIND OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY THEORY — IN 
HIS COMPLAINT HE MENTIONS THAT HE HAD WANTED A LAWYERS TITLE 
POLICY SO HE KNEW WHO WE WERE. HE SAYS IN HIS AFFIDAVIT THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S FILE HAD A COPY OF WHAT HE'S CALLING COMMITMENT 
FOR TITLE INSURANCE. IT WAS ~ WELL, IT WAS ALL THERE. AND 
QUITE FRANKLY, THERE'S NO LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DELAY. 
AND THERE IS SIGNIFICANT PREJUDICE TO US. AND, YOU KNOW, 
WITNESSES ARE GONE. EITHER WE'RE NOW DEALING WITH A SEVEN — 
SEVEN-YEAR-OLD FACTS, DOCUMENTS CAN BE GONE. WHAT HAPPENED, 
YOU KNOW, HAS — YOU KNOW, PROBABLY HAS ALL — HAS ALL 
DISAPPEARED. ANY ATTEMPT, ASSUMING WE WERE LIABLE, TO 
RECOVER AGAINST EITHER JAYSON CHERRY OR AVIS AND ARCHIBALD, 
YOU KNOW, THAT'S — THAT'S LONG GONE. AND AGAIN, THE KEY 
THING IS, IS THAT THERE'S, YOU KNOW, NO REASON APPARENTLY 
ACCORDING TO THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY AS TO WHY WE COULDN'T 
HAVE BEEN ~ COULDN'T HAVE BEEN BROUGHT IN. 
AND THE OTHER THING IS, IS THAT AT THIS POINT, IT WOULD 
ACTUALLY BE FUTILE BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS 
LONG — HAS LONG RUN. AND RULE 15(C), WHICH REFERS TO 
RELATIONSHIP BACK, YOU DON'T RELATE BACK TO WHEN YOU WEREN'T 
IN THE CASE. YOU RELATE BACK, YOU KNOW, THEY CAN ONLY RELATE 
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BACK TO WHEN THEY — AT THE LATEST, WHEN THEY FILED THE 
ORIGINAL AMENDED — AGAIN I'M SAYING THE ORIGINAL AMENDED — 
WHEN THEY FILED THE AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
THE COURT: AND THE STATUTE HAD RUN WHEN THEY FILED THE 
AMENED COMPLAINT ~ 
MR. RAPAPPORT: AND THE STATUTE HAD RUN — 
THE COURT: — THAT WAS THE QUESTION I ASKED TO MR. 
DURBANO — 
MR. RAPAPPORT: -- AT THAT TIME, SO JOINING US NOW WOULD 
BE — WOULD BE FUTILE. SO FOR THOSE REASONS — AND QUITE 
FRANKLY, I HAVE MORE, BUT I'LL TRY AND KEEP IT — KEEP IT 
SHORT ~ WE THINK THAT THE MOTION TO AMEND IS — IS TOO LATE. 
IT'S TO BRING A CLAIM WHICH WOULD BE FUTILE TO BRING BECAUSE 
IT'S BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. IT'S PREJUDICIAL 
AT THIS POINT IN TIME. UNDER THE HUMS VERSUS COOK 
DEVELOPMENT CASE, IT'S — YOU'RE NOT SUPPOSED TO RESPOND TO A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH A MOTION TO AMEND. AND FOR 
THOSE REASONS, WE THINK THE MOTION AMEND SHOULD BE DENIED AND 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. RESPONSE, MR. DURBANO. 
MR. DURBANO: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE NOT TAKEN THE TIME TO 
BRIEF THE ISSUE OF WHAT WOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. THAT WAS WHAT THE COURT ASKED ABOUT. I DID 
GLANCE AT THE PLEADINGS WE FILED EARLIER. I KNOW THAT 
OPPOSING COUNSEL'S INDICATED IT WOULD A THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF 
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LIMITATIONS, THOUGH I READ ALSO UNDER THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS, THOUGH I DIDN'T BRING IT ADMITTEDLY, YOUR HONOR, 
THAT THE — UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT, IT'S SIX YEARS. UNDER A 
VERBAL, IT'S FOUR. WHAT IS THIS REALLY? IS THIS THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF A STATUTE BY A PROSECUTING ATTORNEY? IS IT 
THREE YEARS? I'M NOT POSITIVE OF THE ANSWERS TO THOSE, YOUR 
HONOR, AND IF THAT BECOMES AN ISSUE AT THIS JUNCTURE, I WOULD 
ASK FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO BRIEF THE ISSUE. 
SECONDLY, AND WE SORT OF GLEAMED OVER THIS, BUT IT MAY 
BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE COURT TO GRANT ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER 
56(F) FOR US TO REVIEW THE — WHAT — WHAT'S APPARENTLY 
BECOMING A VERY FACTUAL INTENSIVE DISCUSSION HERE TODAY. 
I HAVE BEEN HANDED TWO LETTERS AS THE COURT HAS RECEIVED 
INDICATING THAT MR. RAPPAPORT WROTE TO ME ASKING THAT WE 
WOULD DISMISS HIM. BE HAPPY TO EXPLAIN THE FACTUAL DETAILS 
AS TO THE BASIS OF THE CONVERSATION, NOT ONLY WITH MR. 
RAPPAPORT, BUT ALSO BY THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE, WHO AS I 
MENTIONED EARLIER IS CLOSELY WATCHING THE OUTCOME OF THIS 
CASE, AND WHO HAS ALWAYS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT A TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY IS STRICTLY LIABLE FOR MISMANAGED ESCROW 
FUNDS. AND THERE WAS ALWAYS AN ASSUMPTION, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
THE TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY AS WELL AS THE LIABILITY 
INSURANCE COMPANY AS NAMED PARTIES TODAY, WERE BACKING UP 
AVIS AND ARCHIBALD THROUGHOUT THIS PROCEEDING. AT THE LEVEL 
AT THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT WHEN CALLED IN FOR MEDIATION, 
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THOSE PARTIES WERE ALSO INVITED TO PARTICIPATE SINCE IT WAS 
ALWAYS PRESUMED THAT THEY WERE THE ONES THAT CARRIED THE 
PURSE STRINGS OR CONTROLLED THE PURSE STRINGS. 
SO THERE'S A — THERE'S A DEEP HISTORY HERE, YOUR HONOR, 
THAT REALLY HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY FLUSHED OUT IN THIS COURT, 
AND IT APPEARS TO ME THAT A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AT THIS JUNCTURE 
WOULD JUST BE PREMATURE FIRST (UNINTELLIGIBLE) SO THEREFORE, 
56(F) WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD TAKE SOME MORE TIME, FLUSH 
THESE THINGS OUT. 
IF THERE IS A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION, YOUR HONOR, IF THE 
COURT PERCEIVES IT THAT WAY, FAIR ENOUGH. I TAKE THE 
POSITION AND THE SUPREME COURT HAS SO STATED THAT SUCH SHOULD 
BE FREELY GRANTED. IF IN FACT IT RELATES BACK TO THE FIRST 
FILING, WE CAN FLUSH THAT OUT AS WE DO DISCOVERY AS TO WHEN 
PARTIES KNEW OR DIDN'T KNOW. WE KNOW THAT THERE IS A 
DISCOVERY RULE ASSOCIATED WITH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
WHICH IS FACTUALLY INTENSIVE AS WELL, YOUR HONOR. 
THOSE WOULD BE MY THOUGHTS ON THOSE (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
THE COURT: COUPLE QUESTIONS THERE, MR. DURBANO. 
MR. DURBANO: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THIS STRIKES ME, HAVING READ IT, THAT YOU 
BROUGHT SUIT AGAINST AVIS AND ARCHIBALD, AND THEN ONCE THEY 
NOT ONLY FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY, BUT THEN DISBANDED AND ARE NO 
LONGER IN EXISTENCE, THEN YOU DECIDED YOU NEEDED TO GO 
AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANIES. I GUESS MY QUESTION IS, WHY 
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DIDN'T THE PLAINTIFF BRING A SUIT AGAINST THE INSURANCE 
COMPANIES AND EVERYBODY UP FRONT IN THE FIRST PLACE JUST TO 
PROTECT FOR THESE TYPE OF SITUATIONS? I MEAN, IT DIDN'T TAKE 
THE TRUSTEE LONG TO FIND THE PROVISION THAT YOU'RE NOW 
RELYING ON. AND WHY WASN'T THAT DONE IN THE FIRST PLACE? 
MR. DURBANO: THAT'S A FAIR QUESTION, YOUR HONOR. MY 
READING OF THE VARIOUS CASE LAW, NOT ONLY IS IT AND CAN IT BE 
POOR FORM TO ~ TO DO THE SHOTGUN APPROACH AND SUE NOT ONLY 
THE AGENTS BUT ALL THE PRINCIPALS AND THEIR INSURANCE 
CARRIERS, BUT THERE HAVE LITERALLY BEEN CASES WHERE SUPREME 
COURT HAS RULED THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO NAME THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, AND SOME SUGGESTION THAT WHEN PUT ON 
NOTICE, RULE 11 MAY BE APPROPRIATE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. DURBANO: HAD WE SUED — FACTITIOUSLY, BUT HAD WE 
SUED GENERAL MOTORS, WOULD WE ALSO NAME THEIR INSURANCE 
CARRIER? NO. WHEN WE SUED AVIS AND ARCHIBALD FOR THIS SET 
OF FACTS AND THEY DEFEND AND INDICATE THAT THEY HAVE 
COVERAGE, SO BE IT. WHEN WE SUE A DEFENDANT ON AN AUTOMOBILE 
ACCIDENT, WE DON'T BRING IN STATE FARM. AND IN FACT, THOSE 
ARE THE CASES THAT HAVE SUGGESTED THAT IT IS HIGHLY 
INAPPROPRIATE AND PREJUDICIAL TO NAME A STATE FARM SOMETIMES 
JUST TO DISCLOSE TO THE JURY, FOR EXAMPLE, A FINDER OF FACT, 
THAT INSURANCE IS HERE TO BACK UP THE — THE ELDERLY LADY WHO 
CAUSED THE ACCIDENT. 
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SO, YOUR HONOR, I'VE NOT SEEN A RULE THAT SAYS THAT YOU 
MUST ALWAYS NAME THE PRINCIPAL, BUT IN FACT, JUST THE 
OPPOSITE. THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY RESPONSE? YES. 
MR. RAPAPPORT: IF I COULD, YOUR HONOR. FIRST OF ALL, 
THOSE CASES ARE TOTALLY INAPPOSITE. AS HE INDICATED, IT'S A 
CAR ACCIDENT CASE WHERE YOU DON'T BRING THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY. BUT HERE WHEN YOUR CLAIM IS AGAINST THE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, NOT THAT WHERE, YOU KNOW, JUST BACKING UP WHERE 
WE'VE ISSUED A LIABILITY POLICY FOR AVIS AND ARCHIBALD, BUT 
YOU'RE SAYING YOU'RE LIABLE UNDER A STATUTE, YOU HAVE TO SUE 
US. AND I THINK THE COURT HAD, YOU KNOW, THE EXACT CORRECT 
QUESTION, AND THE ANSWER WAS, IS THAT THERE WAS, AS I HEARD 
IT, IS THAT THERE REALLY IS NO REASON, BECAUSE THIS REASON 
THAT WE'RE GIVEN THAT, OH, YOU'RE NOT SUPPOSED TO SUE AN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, JUST DOES NOT APPLY HERE BECAUSE WE'RE NOT 
INDEMNIFYING AVIS AND ARCHIBALD. HE'S SUING US UNDER A 
STATUTE. AND SINCE HE IS SUING US UNDER A STATUTE, THE 
THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THAT WE CITED TO, YOU KNOW, 
APPLY. SO HE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF IT. YOU KNOW, 
WE'VE — THIS HAS BEEN PENDING A LONG, LONG TIME. HE'S HAD 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF IT FOR, YOU KNOW, FOR QUITE SOME — 
YOU KNOW, FOR QUITE SOME TIME. THERE'S NO REASON TO GET MORE 
TIME BECAUSE HE DIDN'T BRIEF IT WHEN HE WAS SUPPOSED TO BRIEF 
IT. AND 56(F) DOESN'T HAVE TO, YOU KNOW, THE STATUTE OF 
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1 LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT ISN'T PART OF OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
2 JUDGMENT. THAT'S PART OF HIS MOTION TO, YOU KNOW, IT'S IN 
3 RESPONSE TO HIS MOTION TO AMEND. THE 56(F) HAS TO GO AS TO 
4 THE FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM THAT HE HAS. AND WE'VE 
5 BEEN IN THIS CASE, YOU KNOW, SINCE 2002. THIS IS NOW 2004. 
6 HE HASN'T SENT OUT ANY DISCOVERY, HE HASN'T TAKEN ANY 
7 DISPOSITIONS. WE'VE PROVIDED TO HIM AND WE'VE PROVIDED TO 
8 THE COURT IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND HE HAD TO HAVE IN HIS 
9 OWN FILES BECAUSE THIS IS CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. DURBANO. 
10 THIS IS NOT SOMETHING THAT'S SECRET, YOU KNOW, WHEN HE ASKED 
11 FOR INFORMATION AND WHEN HE GOT THE RESPONSES, AND IN THE — 
12 IN HIS RESPONSE TO OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, HE 
13 DOESN'T DENY ANY OF THAT. ALL OF OUR PARAGRAPHS ARE IN FACT 
14 ADMITTED. AND THE ONLY THING THAT HE DID, IF YOU LOOK AT HIS 
15 MEMO IN OPPOSITION TO OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE 
16 ONLY THING THAT HE DID WAS HE SAID ADDITIONAL FACTS. AND 
17 WHAT HE DID THERE WAS, IS THAT HE MISQUOTED HIS OWN PARAGRAPH 
18 44 OF THE COMPLAINT. HE LEFT PART OUT OF WHAT HE'D ACTUALLY 
19 QUOTE, YOU KNOW, WHAT — WHAT HE HAD WRITTEN, AND HE MADE IT 
20 SOUND LIKE WE HAD ISSUED A REGULAR LIABILITY INDEMNITY 
21 POLICY, YOU KNOW, WHICH WE HAD NEVER DONE AND — BUT HIS 
22 ALLEGATION HAS IN FACT ACTUALLY SAYS THAT WE FAILED TO TELL 
23 HIM ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIREMAN'S FUND POLICY. THAT'S 
24 THE ACCUSATION AGAINST US, WHEN THE DOCUMENTATION IS 100 
25 PERCENT CLEAR AND UNDISPUTED THAT WE DID TELL HIM ABOUT IT AS 
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SOON AS WE WERE ASKED. 
THE COURT: OKAY. ANYTHING ELSE, MR. DURBANO? YOU HAVE 
FINAL SAY. OTHERWISE, THE COURT'S PREPARED TO RULE. 
MR. DURBANO: GOTTA ADD ONE THING, YOUR HONOR ~ 
THE COURT: YES, SIR. 
MR. DURBANO: ~ (UNINTELLIGIBLE) ALWAYS FRUSTRATING TO 
COME TO COURT AS A CASE GETS AGED LIKE THIS AND HEAR OPPOSING 
COUNSEL SAY THAT THERE'S BEEN PLENTY OF TIME FOR MR. DURBANO 
TO DO THIS AND THAT. BUT MR. DURBANO'S WORKED HARD ON THIS 
CASE THROUGH THE BANKRUPTCY COURT, AND I NOTICED EVERYBODY 
WAS HAPPY TO SIT BACK AND WATCH WHILE MR. DURBANO AND HIS 
CLIENTS FUNDED THAT EFFORT AND PURSUED IT DILIGENTLY. AND 
HERE TODAY WE'RE HEARD TO SAY THAT, WELL, MR. DURBANO SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN DOING ALL OF THESE THINGS WITH THESE INSURANCE 
COMPANIES THAT BY THEIR VERY DEFINITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
BACKING UP AVIS AND ARCHIBALD AND THE INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES 
THAT RELIED UPON THE FACT THAT THIS AGENCY WAS INSURED. 
THAT'S (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. COURT'S PREPARED TO RULE. I'M 
GONNA START FIRST IN RULING ON THE DEFENDANT LAWYERS TITLE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. I WOULD GRANT THAT MOTION. I 
THINK THAT YOU ARE ENTITLED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO A 
JUDGMENT — SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF THE FRAUDULENT 
NONDISCLOSURE. THAT WAS THE ONLY ISSUE THAT WAS RAISED IN 
THAT FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. YOU FILED A MOTION. WITH ALL 
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DUE RESPECT, MR. DURBANO, I THINK THE CASE THAT THEY CITED ME 
IS CLEAR, YOU CAN'T FILE A COMPLAINT ALLEGING THEORY A., THEY 
FILE A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEORY A., AND THEN YOU 
SAY, WELL, I HAVE THEORY B. OUT HERE THAT'S NOT IN HERE, SO 
THEREFORE, ALLOW ME TO AMEND. THE CASE LAW IN MY OPINION IS 
RIGHT ON THE MONEY, YOU CAN'T DO THAT, BASED UPON THE FACTS 
THAT I HAVE BEFORE ME, WHICH ARE UNSTIPULATE — WHICH ARE 
STIPULATED, AND TO ME THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE INITIAL COMPLAINT THAT YOU FILED. 
THAT BRINGS ME TO YOUR MOTION FOR — WELL, NO, THAT 
BRINGS ME NEXT TO THE MOTION TO AMEND. I'M GONNA DENY THE 
MOTION TO AMEND. IT'S A CLOSE CALL. I RECOGNIZE WHAT YOU 
JUST TOLD ME, MR. DURBANO. THERE ARE THREE THINGS I HAVE TO 
CONSIDER: THE TIMELINESS OF IT. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, 
TIMELINESS CAN BE JUDGED IN TWO WAYS. I TRULY BELIEVE THAT 
THIS WAS A LAWSUIT THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAD AGAINST THE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES FROM THE GET-GO. I MEAN IT'S A STATUTORY 
REMEDY. IT'S NOT LIKE SUING THE OWNER OF CAR AND DECIDING 
WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAVE TO NAME THE INSURANCE COMPANY OR NOT. 
FROM THE GET-GO, YOU HAD A STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION, NOT 
ONLY AGAINST AVIS AND ARCHIBALD TITLE INSURANCE; YOU HAD A 
STATUTORY CLAIM AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND THEY 
COULD HAVE BEEN SUED DIRECTLY AT ANY TIME RIGHT OUT OF THE 
CHUTE BECAUSE THAT STATUTE EXISTS. 
IT'S CLOSE, BUT ON THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS, I DON'T 
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1 THINK THAT IT'S TIMELY. I THINK, AS I INDICATED BEFORE, I 
2 HAVE THE SENSE THAT EVERYBODY THOUGHT THIS WAS GONNA BE 
3 HANDLED, AND THEN WHEN AVIS AND ARCHIBALD WENT OUT OF 
4 BUSINESS AND FILED BANKRUPTCY, THE PLAINTIFFS HAD TO SCRAMBLE 
5 TO FIND WHERE THE DEEP POCKETS MIGHT BE IN THIS PARTICULAR 
6 SITUATION. 
7 THE SECOND FACTOR THAT I HAVE TO CONSIDER IS THE 
8 JUSTIFICATION FOR A DELAY. AND YOU HIT THAT, MR. DURBANO, I 
9 DO THINK THAT YOU HAVE BEEN BUSY AND VIGOROUSLY TRYING TO 
10 PROCESS THIS THROUGH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TENTH 
11 CIRCUIT AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT. AND ON THE JUSTIFICATION 
12 FOR DELAY, I THINK YOU HAVE SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DELAY, 
13 BUT I DON'T THINK IT'S TIMELY BECAUSE I THINK YOU COULDA DONE 
14 IT RIGHT OUT OF THE CHUTE. AND THEN, SECOND OF ALL, I AM 
15 PERSUADED THAT AFTER THIS PASSAGE OF TIME AND WITH THE 
16 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IT WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL AND UNFAIR TO 
17 THE DEFENDANTS TO HAVE TO DEFEND ON A CLAIM THAT COULD HAVE 
18 COME RIGHT OUT OF THE CHUTE, AND NOW THEY WOULD BE FACED WITH 
19 SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE TIME BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
20 LIMITATIONS. THAT'S ABOUT AS PREJUDICIAL AS I THINK THAT YOU 
21 CAN GET. SO ON THAT SITUATION, I WOULD DENY THE MOTION TO 
22 AMEND BECAUSE I THINK OF TWO OF THE THREE CRITERIA, THEY 
23 WEIGH AGAINST YOU, AND I WOULD NOT ALLOW YOU TO AMEND YOUR 
24 COMPLAINT AT THIS LATE DATE TO DO THAT. 
25 THAT MAKES THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT I SHOULD GRANT 
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YOUR MOTION FOR JUDGMENT MOOT BECAUSE IF I'M NOT GONNA ALLOW 
YOU TO AMEND IT, YOU'RE NOT ENTITLED TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON YOUR STATUTORY REMEDY. 
ON THE ISSUE OF BIG SKY'S MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE, I 
WOULD DENY THAT, TOO. 
THE FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT HAS BEEN 
FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS, I DON'T THINK ANY OTHER DISCOVERY OR 
ANYTHING WOULD ADD TO THAT PARTICULAR SITUATION. I KNOW ALL 
THE FACTS IN THE SENSE THAT YOU SENT A LETTER, THEY 
RESPONDED, THEY DISCLOSED TO YOU IMMEDIATELY THE EXISTENCE OF 
FIREMAN'S FUND WHO HAS THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY POLICY 
THAT WAS ISSUED. I JUST DON'T SEE HOW YOU COULD CONCEIVABLY 
PREVAIL OR OBTAIN NEW INFORMATION OTHER THAN WHAT'S BEEN TOLD 
ME ON THE FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE IN REGARDS TO LAWYERS 
TITLE. AND SO I DON'T SEE WHY IT WOULD NEED TO BE CONTINUED 
FOR FURTHER DISCOVERY. 
YOU HAVE PREVAILED ON THE MOTION. WILL YOU PREPARE AN 
ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS RULING? 
MR. RAPAPPORT: WE WILL, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT I NEED TO CLARIFY FOR 
ANY OF THE PARTIES? 
MR. RAPAPPORT: I THINK IT'S CLEAR. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING, MR. DURBANO? 
MR. DURBANO: I UNDERSTAND THE RULING, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. NOW, I JUST WANNA ADDRESS 
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1 FIREMAN'S FUND. YES, YOU WERE BANDIED AROUND IN PLEADINGS 
2 FROM BOTH SIDES, BUT YOU'RE NOT BEFORE ME ON ANYTHING, MR. 
3 BELNAP, SO YOU'LL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE DUST SORTS AND SEE 
4 WHAT — HOW THIS IMPACTS YOUR CLIENT'S POSITION. BUT YOU AND 
5 MR. DURBANO GET TO LIVE TO FIGHT ANOTHER DAY. OKAY? 
6 MR. RAPAPPORT: THANK YOU. 
7 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
gl ***** 
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